Constitutional Law - The Eighth Amendment and Prison Reform by Rosenberg, Ronald H
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1973
Constitutional Law - The Eighth Amendment and
Prison Reform
Ronald H. Rosenberg
William & Mary Law School, rhrose@wm.edu
Copyright c 1973 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Rosenberg, Ronald H., "Constitutional Law - The Eighth Amendment and Prison Reform" (1973). Faculty Publications. Paper 670.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/670
1973] PRISON REFORM 
Constitutional Law-The Eighth Amendment 
and Prison Reform 
1539 
The conditions within many American prisons have made the pe-
nal system a national disgrace. From time to time crisis situations have 
erupted, and the public has been made aware of the desperate need for 
reform of the practices and conditions of confinement of prison inmates. 
In the past several years the courts, and especially the lower federal 
courts, have begun to take a more active role in ameliorating abject 
prison conditions. The primary constitutional theory underlying these 
suits has been the eighth amendment prohibition against the inflic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment.1 Two recent cases, Baker v. 
Hamilton2 and Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 3 have em-
phasized the importance of social rehabilitation in finding the condi-
tions of juvenile confinement unlawful. These cases suggest that in the 
future the eighth amendment might serve as the constitutional founda-
tion for the precept that lawful confinement of adults as well as juve-
niles requires rehabilitative services. Although this possibility seems 
unlikely at the present time, the trend in the eighth amendment cases 
does provide a potential avenue for courts to follow if the essential pur-
pose of the criminal justice system were to be changed from punish-
ment to reformation. This note will discuss the evolution of the eighth 
73. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton,_405 U.S. 727, 739-40 (1972); Baker v. Carr, 
369 u.s. 186, 204-08 (1962). 
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNST. amend. vm. 
2. 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972). 
3. 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). 
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amendment as a device for prison reform4 and will suggest that reha-
biliation for the prisoner should be a right. 
The text of the eighth amendment of the Constitution was taken 
from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.5 The original purpose of 
the article was to eliminate the executions and tortures practiced by 
the Stuart monarchy. It was incorporated into the United States Consti-
tution .in 1791 after being adopted in nine colonial constitutions. 6 Ini-
tially and throughout the nineteenth century, 7 the amendment was in-
terpreted to prohibit extreme forms of corporal punishment. The Su-
preme Court in In re Kemmler found certain punishments to be man-
ifestly cruel and unusual. Among these were crucifixion, burning on 
the stake, and breaking on the wheel. 9 A significant change in inter-
pretation came in 1910 with Weems v. United States.10 In that case 
the Supreme Court forbade .infliction of cadena temporal, 11 a Spanish ver-
sion of hard labor, upon a man convicted in the Philippines of falsify-
ing entries in government records because the punishment was out of 
all proportion to the seriousness of the crime. The term of punishment 
was fifteen years. The Supreme Court held this statutory penalty un-
constitutional under the Philippine bill of rights, which contained a 
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."12 Weems ex-
pressly recognized that this concept is flexible and responsive to social 
norms.13 
Several other tests for determining whether a particular punish-
ment is cruel and unusual have been suggested since the Weems deci-
sion. By far the more frequently recognized standard is to inquire 
whether the penalty administered "shocks the general conscience of 
4. For a thorough treatment of the historical development of the "cruel and 
unusual" prohibition see Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the 
Substantive Criminal Law, 19 HAR.v. L. REV. 635 (1966). 
5. "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." 1. W. & M. 2, c.2, § 10. 
6. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original 
Meaning, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 840 (1969). 
7. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878). 
8. 136 u.s. 436 (1890). 
9. Id. at 446-47. 
10. 217 u.s. 349 (1910). 
11. Id. at 364. 
12. Id. at 365, 367-68. 
13. The majority stated that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime 
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense," id. at 367, while also noting, 
"The clause of the Constitution . . . is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire 
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id. at 378, 
It should be noted that the former notion of proportionality first appeared in the dis-
sent to O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892). 
1973] PRISON REFORM 1541 
civilized society."14 Another measurement, proposed by Justice Gold-
berg in Rudolph v. Alabama,15 would gauge the relationship between 
the punishment inflicted and the penal aim sought to be achieved.16 
In Trop v. Dullesl-7 Chief Justice Warren noted that the eighth amend-
ment was not static and that "[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society."18 These standards are at once vague and flexible. 
Historically, the judiciary has been reluctant to involve itself in the 
operation of the correctional system on either the state or the federal 
level. The courts largely appear to believe that they have satisfied 
their responsibilities under the law once a decision has been rendered. 
Several reasons have been offered to support this "hands off" policy.19 
One prevalent explanation is based on the principle of the separation 
of powers: 
[I]nasmuch as Congress has placed control of the federal prison sys-
tem under the Attorney General, and inasmuch as the control of a 
state prison system is vested in the Governor or his delegated rep-
resentative, a federal court is powerless to intervene in the inter-
nal administration of this executive function even to protect prison-
ers from the deprivation of their constitutional rights. 20 
Another explanation is that the courts lack expertise in the field of 
penology and feel that they should leave corrections to knowledgeable 
prison administrators. Finally, the reluctance to become involved is 
sometimes explained by a fear that intervention will subvert internal 
prison discipline and therefore harm the criminal justice system. 21 
Slowly jurists have begun to realize that the courts and the pri-
sons are components in a continuous system of administration of jus-
tice and that the court's responsibility continues beyond sentencing. 
Courts have found that prison regulations should not always supersede 
14. E.g., Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1969); Lee v. Tahash, 
352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965). 
15. 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); accord, Jordan v. Fitz-
harris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966). 
16. The Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), held that 
imprisonment for the crime of "being" a drug addict was cruel and unusual. 
17. 356 u.s. 86 (1957). 
18. ld. at 101. 
19. For the origin of this denomination see Comment, Beyond the Ken of the 
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE 
L.J. 506 n.4 (1963). 
20. Comment, The Inadequacy of Prisoners Rights to Provide Sufficient Pro-
tection for Those Confined in Penal Institutions, 48 N.C.L. REv. 847, 849 n.8 (1970). 
21. See, e.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (lOth Cir. 1969). 
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the personal rights of the convict. 22 Consequently, the Supreme Court 
in Johnson v. Avery23 rejected the "hands off'' policy in 1969. The 
abject conditions existing in the prisons and the mounting pressures 
for prison reform have led to this result. 
Before reaching the question of the prisoner's right to rehabili-
tation it is important to examine the current eighth amendment cases 
that have found the daily living conditions within prisons to be 
"cruel and unusual." The most significant recent decision in this 
field is Holt v. Sarver/4 in which the conditions at the Arkansas state 
prison farms were found to violate the eighth amendment. In that 
case the use of severely crowded open barracks, isolation cells, the 
trusty guard system25 and corporal punishment, the lack of supervision, 
and the existence of unrestrained inmate brutality combined to make 
the operation of the state system cruel and unusual. 26 
The Holt court approached the problems of the Arkansas prisons 
in a comprehensive fashion. First, the court viewed the dictates of the 
eighth amendment as applying to the rights of the prison population 
as a whole and not solely to the treatment of one specific inmate. 27 
Secondly, the general living conditions in the facilities, rather than any 
one practice of the administrators, were determined to constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment. Thirdly, the test of unlawful incarcer-
ation required the objectionable conduct to be "confinement . . . char-
22. The court in Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. 
denied, 225 U.S. 887 (1945), stated, "A prisoner retains all of the rights of an ordinary 
citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law. 
While the law does take his liberty and imposes a duty of servitude and observance 
of discipline for his regulation and that of other prisoners, it does not deny his right 
to personal security against unlawful invasion." 
23. 393 u.s. 483, 486 (1969). 
24. 309 F. Supp. 362 (D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1970). 
But cf. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 266 
(1968) (per curiam). Wilson found that work camps per se did not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment. The important decision of Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660 (1962), incorporated the eighth amendment through the fourteenth amend-
ment and made it applicable to the states. 
25. The use of a particular trusty guard system was also found violative of the 
eighth amendment in Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 828 (5th Cir. 1971). Contra, 
George v. Sowers, 268 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 1972). 
26. 309 F. Supp. at 372-82. 
27. It appears to the Court, however, that the concept of "cruel and un-
usual punishment" is not limited to instances in which a particular inmate is 
subjected to a punishment directed at him as an individual. In the Court's es-
timation confinement itself within a given institution may amount to cruel 
and unusual punishment prohibited by the Constitution where the confinement 
is chara.cterized by conditions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the 
conscience of reasonably civilized people even though a particular inmate 
may never personally be subjected to any disciplinary action. 
Id. at 372-73. 
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acterized by conditions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the 
conscience of reasonably civilized people . . . . "28 That standard was 
recognized as changeable but would "broaden as society tends to pay 
more regard to human decency and dignity and becomes, or likes to 
think that it becomes, more humane."29 Fourthly, the court adopted a 
continuing role in the supervision of the state penal institutions. Af-
ter declaring that conditions in the Arkansas prison system constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment, the court ordered the state to improve 
the physical conditions and the supervisory practices at each work 
camp. The court specified that the Commissioner of Corrections was to 
submit a plan to ameliorate conditions and added what it considered to 
be minimal guidelines for operating prison facilities. As a sanction for 
noncompliance with the order, the court threatened to enjoin the use 
of the two work farms altogether. In addition, the court was to moni-
tor the progress on a continuing basis by requiring periodic reports of 
prison conditions. Finally, recognizing both the financial burden of 
effecting such an extenSive modification and the reluctance of the ex-
ecutive branch to appropriate funds, the court placed ultimate respon-
sibility for change on the Commissioner of Corrections. 30 Obviously the 
Holt court viewed the absolute "hands off" policy as obsolete. 
A year after the Holt decision an Ohio court encountered a similar 
situation in Jones v. Wittenberg.31 The inmates of the Lucas County 
Jail, as a class, brought a federal civil rights action32 alleging that se-
vere overcrowding of the facility, inadequate sanitary conditions, poor 
interior lighting, inferior food and medical services, and improper cus-
todial supervision had subjected them to cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The district court agreed and found conditions constitutionally 
unacceptable. 33 In his subsequent order the trial judge listed the spe-
cific conditions to be improved and set the time within which the re-
medial action was to be taken. 34 The major difficulty confronting the 
28. ld. 
29. ld. at 380. 
30. Let there be no mistake in the matter; the obligation of the Respondents 
to eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not depend upon what the Leg-
islature may do, or upon what the Governor may do, or, indeed, upon what 
Respondents may actually be able to accomplish. If Arkansas is going to 
operate a Penitentiary System, it is going to have to be a system that is counte-
nanced by the Constitution of the United States. 
!d. at 385. 
31. 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
32. ld. Most actions are brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (1970). 
33. 323 F. Supp. at 99. 
34. The size of the jail population, the interior lighting, the number and quality 
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court was to determine the source of funds for the project. Aware 
that the judiciary has no inherent power of taxation, the court ordered 
the sheriff and other officials to reallocate their budgeted funds to 
effect the enumerated rehabilitative changes. sr; The court was to re-
tain continuing jurisdiction over the matter so that "the changes of 
methods and practices required will not be abandoned, forgotten, or 
neglected, but [will] become permanently established."36 
In Hamilton v. Schiro31 the prisoners of Orleans Parish Prison se-
cured an injunction forbidding the operation of the prison facility. The 
living conditions within the institution were so inhumane and physically 
dangerous that the court, rather than attempt to fashion relief to re-
form the prison, enjoined its use altogether. The trial judge concluded 
his opinion tersely: 
Prison life inevitably involves some deprivation of rights, but 
the conditions of the plaintiff's confinement in Orleans Parish Pri-
son so shock the conscience as a matter of elemental decency and 
are so much more cruel than is necessary to achieve a legitimate 
penal aim that such confinement constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment .... 38 
The destructive conditions of inhumane prison confinement were 
comprehensively assessed in Gates v. Collier.89 In that case, brought by 
the prisoners at the Mississippi State Prison at Parchman as a class ac-
tion, 40 the court found conditions to be unlawful under state law41 as 
well as under the eighth amendment. The opinion granted injunctive 
and declaratory relief to the plaintiffs. The cruel and unusual punish-
of guards and other personnel, diet and food service, sanitation and personal hygiene, 
medical treatment, communications with visitors and attorneys, and available reading 
material were all included in special parts of the court order. Jones v. Wittenberg, 
330 F. Supp. 707,714-20 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
35. ld. at 713. 
36. ld. at 721. 
37. 338 F. Supp. 1016 (B.D. La. 1970). In addition, the court determined that 
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not require the exhaustion of available state reme-
dies as a necessary condition precedent to federal court action. ld. at 1019; accord, 
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
38. 338 F. Supp. at 1019. In the court's "Findings of Fact," the adverse condi-
tions of the prison were enumerated. It was noted that there were 900 prisoners in the 
space built for 400, that six to eight inmates inhabited a cell 13 feet by 8.5 feet by 7.5 
feet in size, that sanitation facilities were inoperable, mattresses were never cleaned, 
exercise was only permitted once in twenty or thirty days, and that the kitchen, 
sanitation, and shower system were infested with rats, mice, and roaches. ld. ut 
1016-18. 
39. 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972). 
40. The prisoners at Parchman brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 
1994 (1970). 
41. Miss. CoDE ANN.§§ 7930, 7942, 7959, 7968 (Supp. 1971). 
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ment found in Gates was composed of two parts: the deleterious ef-
fects of .inhumane living conditions and the danger of prisoner mistreat-
ment by armed trusty guards and other inmates. 42 The court care-
fully noted that public and official apathy regarding the state of incar-
cerated prisoners was a cause of the deficiencies at Parchman. 43 Basing 
its authority to act on the need to protect the constitutional rights of the 
prisoners, the court specifically set out the physical and administra-
tive improvements required to meet constitutional standards and es-
tablished the time in which to make them. 44 In addition, the order re-
quired prompt submission of a comprehensive plan for the guidance of 
future improvements. 45 The court was to retain jurisdiction over the 
project indefintely. Fortunately for the Gates court, the matter of 
funding was not a serious problem because of the immediate availability 
of federal assistance. 46 
Judge Keady in the Gates case expressed what had been an implic-
it development in the previous cases when he recognized that prison-
ers have a constitutional right to "adequate provision for their physical 
health and well-being .... "47 The eighth amendment prohibition had 
traditionally been interpreted as forbidding certain intolerable prac-
tices. But imprisonment generally was not considered to be a pro-
scribed punishment. The courts in the cases surveyed have had little 
difficulty in drawing the analogy between objectionable physical pun-
ishment and inhumane imprisonment conditions. The application of 
the cruel and unusual punishment standard in each case has established 
minimal requirements for lawful confinement. But surprisingly, the 
42. The problem of inhumane living conditions was described in the court's 
findings in these terms: "The housing units at Par.chman are unfit for human habita-
tion under any modem concept of decency. The facilities at all camps for the dis-
posal of human and other waste are shockingly inadequate and present an immediate 
health hazard." 349 F. Supp. at 887. As to the competency of the trusty guards the 
court stated, "Penitentiary records indicate that many of the armed trusties have 
been convicted of violent crimes, and that of the armed trusties serving as of April 1, 
1971, 35% had not been psychologically tested, 40% of those tested were found to be 
retarded, and 71% of those tested were found to have personality disorders." Id. at 
889. 
43. Id. at 888. 
44. Id. at 898-903. 
45. Id. at 903-04. 
46. The notoriety of the case had attracted suff~cient federal interest to warrant a 
commitment to the Parchman prison of one million dollars by the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice. ld. at 892. 
47. Id. at 894. This has been recognized previously by courts but apparently 
never utilized to guarantee prison rights. ''The obligation of a State to treat its con-
victs with decency and humanity is an absolute one and a federal court will not over-
look a breach of that duty." Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 1949), 
rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949). 
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historically vague constitutional prohibition has been used to secure 
extremely specific levels of decency for the treatment of convicts. Fur-
thermore, the eighth amendment cases have delineated affirmative rights 
for prisoners. 48 
On the perimeter of the evolving eighth amendment theory of pris-
oner rights is the question of whether the denial of rehabilitative activ-
ities constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. This problem has not 
been squarely faced although several courts have placed vocational 
training among those factors to be considered in determining the con-
stitutionality of prison conditions. 49 But no court, as yet, has invalidated 
a penal system solely because of the absence of rehabilitative pro-
grams.5o 
However, the lack of social rehabilitative programs was an impor-
tant factor in two recent cases concerning juveniles. In Inmates of Boys' 
Training School v. Affleck51 officials had transferred "problem" inmates 
from the Boys Home to maximum and medium security adult prison 
facilities and occasionally to the solitary confinement cells located there. 
The court enjoined the use of the adult prison for the non-criminal ju-
venile population of the Home. The opinion stressed the purpose of ju-
venile confinement, which under Rhode Island law is "instruction and 
reformation."52 Because rehabilitation was the reason for confinement 
48. A common issue in many eighth amendment cases is the adequacy of medical 
care. There has been a proliferation of cases finding that denial of medical care to in-
dividual prisoners violates the eighth amendment. See United States v. Fitzgerald, 
466 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp, 278, 280-81 
(M.D. Ala. 1972); Lopez-Tijerina v. Ciccone, 324 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (W.D. Mo. 
1971); Owens v. Alldridge, 311 F. Supp. 667, 669 (W.D. Okla. 1970); Ramsey v. 
Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600,605 (W.D. Mo. 1970). 
49. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
50. Even the court in Holt v. Sarver refused to go that far: 
This Court knows that a sociological theory or idea may ripen into 
.constitutional law; many such theories and ideas have done so. But, this 
Court is not prepared to say that such a ripening has occurred as yet as far 
as rehabilitation of convicts is concerned. Given an otherwise unexceptional 
penal institution, the Court is not willing to hold that confinement in it is 
unconstitutional simply because the institution does not operate a school, or 
provide vocational training, or other rehabilitative facilities and services 
which many institutions now offer. 
309 F. Supp. at 379. 
51. 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). None of the youths in the Boys' Training 
School had been adjudicated as criminals. They comprised five classifications: 1) those 
committed by their parents, 2) those awaiting trial, 3) those .convicted of delin-
quency, 4) those found to be wayward, and 5) those determined to be neglected or 
dependent. ld. at 1369. 
52. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 13-4-1, -13, -15 (1956). Also the court noted that 
"[t]he Rhode Island legislature, in establishing its juvenile justice system, has spe-
cifically directed that it have rehabilitative, nonpenal, goals." 346 F. Supp. at 1364. 
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of juveniles, the court concluded that the conditions constituting cruel 
and unusual punishment need not be as grave as those found in the 
prior adult criminal imprisonment cases. The court in Affleck deter-
mined that the mixing of juveniles with the adult prison population was 
especially destructive of any attempt at reform. While access to read-
ing matter, fresh air and exercise, educational and vocational training, 
outside visitors, and recreational diversion were all mentioned as being 
vital to the development of the youths, the court primarily based its de-
cision on placing the youths in the same areas with the criminal adults. 
Although the eighth amendment was used to protect detained juveniles 
from the harshness of the physical conditions present in the criminal 
justice system, the court did not find an explicit right to those services 
and amenities thought necessary for effective rehabilitation. 
Baker v. Hamilton53 held that the selective confinement of juve-
niles within the criminal county jail for "shock value"54 did in fact con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment. Citing the dilapidated physical 
condition of the jail, the lack of exercise and recreation, and the ab-
sence of any rehabilitative value in jail confinement, the court ordered 
the referral practice to cease. Once again, the fact that the county 
jail "is a penal institute designed primarily for punishment rather than 
rehabilitation"55 weighed heavily. Baker did not provide a well-de-
fined test for measuring impermissible confinement conditions for juve-
niles, but it did note that the severity of circumstances need not be as 
dire as those necessary for court action in an adult case. 
The application of the eighth amendment in both of these juve-
nile confinement situatlons was closely limited to the physical condi-
tions of the holding facility. Although rehabilitation was not required 
by the dictates of the Constitution, it was explicitly recognized as a 
duty by state statute. 56 These cases have underscored the judicial aware-
ness of the importance of rehabilitation as the primary objective of 
the juvenile reformative process. This recognition reflects the accept-
53. 345 F. Supp. 435 (W.O. Ky. 1972). 
54. ld. at 349. 
55. ld. at 352. The fact that non-criniinal juveniles were being placed into con-
tact with hardened adult offenders was considered especially counter-rehabilitative 
since the juveniles, in the opinion of an expert witness, seek to identify with the older 
inmates and would learn the criminal trade. ld. at 348. In Martarella v. Kelley, 
349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court solely based its decision to force the 
closing of the Manida youth facility on the grounds that the institution presented a 
physical danger to its inhabitants. Rehabilitative treatment of the juveniles was not 
mentioned. ld. at 597. 
56. 346 F. Supp. at 1367; 345 F. Supp. at 351. 
1548 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51 
ance of the theories of child psychologists and sociologistsu7 and serves 
as a repudiation of the concept of penal juvenile confinement. Unfor-
tunately, theoreticians for adult treatment have not met such a favorable 
response. 
Modem penologists58 have recognized social retraining of the 
adult criminal as the ultimate objective of the prison system and have 
discarded prior notions of deterrence, retribution, and isolation as the 
fundamental purposes for confining inmates. The changing emphasis 
views the prison as a place of correction rather than punishment--one 
which administers treatment instead of inflicting revenge. r;o Many re-
habilitative theories are currently being discussed but few, if any, have 
been empirically examined. 6° Consequently, there is no unanimity in 
approaching the task of reforming the American criminal. Every scheme 
hopes to return the inmate to society as a well-adjusted and productive 
individual who will not subsequently re-enter prison. Spiraling crime 
rates61 and staggering prisoner recidivism62 have made the public and 
correctional officials painfully aware that the existing retributive sys-
tem of punishment is not properly serving society. 63 Although pop-
ular opinion acknowledges the logic of attempting to reform crimi-
nals, no effective citizen's movement has yet mobilized to attack the 
problem and lobby for change. Extensive inmate rehabilitation pro-
51. Gough, The Beyond-Control Child and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise 
in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. LoUis L.J. 182 (1971 ); Note, Non-Delinquent 
Children in New York: The Need for Alternatives to Institutional Treatment, 8 
CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 251 (1972). 
58. E.g., R. CLARK, C!uME IN AMERICA 220 (1970); CONTEMPORARY PUNISH· 
MENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 175-227 (R. Gerber & P. McAn-
any eds. 1972); J. MARTIN & D. WEBSTER, SociAL CoNSEQUENCES OF CoNVICTION 
216-223 (1971); Leopold, What's Wrong With the Prison System, 45 NEB. L. RBV. 
33 (1966). 
59. ''The function of punishment must accordingly be directed to its social pur-
pose • . • • [l]t is the future and not the past, not the crime committed, that sets the 
goal and the purpose sought." R. SALEILLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT 
9 (1913). 
60. One novel proposal combines the economic incentive of self-interest with 
prisoner reform. This amalgam of social work and business principles rewards so-
cially desirable behavior with credits towards an early release. See Williams & Fish, 
Rehabilitation and Economic Self-Interest, 17 C!uME & DELINQUENCY 406 (1971). 
61. PREsiDENT'S CoMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE .ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CruME IN A FREE SoCIETY 22-31 (1967). 
62. R. CLARK, supra note 56, at 215; N. MoRRIS, THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 1-29 
(1951); Robison & Smith, Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DB· 
LINQUENCY 67 (1971). 
63. MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 102(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For a list 
of states recognizing the reformatory purpose of punishment see Singer, Bringing the 
Constitution to Prison: Substantive Due Process and the Eighth Amendment, 39 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 650, 676 n.136 (1970). 
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grams would demand significant amounts of public funds. At present 
popular commitment to prison reform has not yet guaranteed humane 
living conditions, so there is no reason to believe that rehabilitation 
would be more favorably received. 
Until now the eighth amendment has been used to forbid brutal 
forms of punishment and incarceration under abusive conditions. In 
order to establish rehabilitation as a protected right, confinement for 
purposes other than rehabilitation, even under decent conditions, must 
be declared "cruel and unusual." Such a step would represent a funda-
mental modification in the conventional view of the role of institution-
alized punishment. The prior developments in eighth amendment 
theory have not necessitated elemental alterations in the criminal 
justice system. They have only accomplished reform by forcing the 
system to operate in the manner in which it was originally intended, yet 
without excessive cruelty. As such, these cases presented limited is-
sues for the courts to deal with. State and federal statutes would un-
doubtedly be necessary to establish rehabilitation as the acknowledged 
purpose of the correctional system. If they were enacted, the court's 
primary concern would be the proper administration of the statutory ob-
jectives. With this statutory foundation, the judiciary might use the 
eighth amendment to secure rehabilitative treatment as a right. Sec-
ondarily, the constitutional principle might also establish rehabilitation 
as the paramount purpose of a criminal justice system in a recalcitrant 
jurisdiction. Here the amendment could be utilized to instigate change 
rather than to enforce stated goals. As long as society determines 
that punitive incarceration is a tolerable and desirable manner in which 
to manage the problems posed by criminal offenders, the eighth 
amendment will do little to provide for rehabilitation. The amend-
ment's application merely reflects existing social notions of decency 
towards prisoners. Only when the public replaces the presently held 
penal objectives with the reformative purposes proposed by penologists 
will an affirmative role for the amendment exist. 
The eighth amendment is currently being used to secure the right 
to humane living conditions for prisoners in various parts of the country. 
Whether public sensibilities will become enlightened to the point 
where the reformative nature of corrections is recognized remains a mat-
ter for conjecture. In any case, the courts have shown themselves to 
be ill-equipped for the task of managing and upgrading the American 
prison system. One major impediment is the lack of funds. Because 
of the separation of powers, the judiciary has limited authority to com-
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pel the executive to increase the funding allotment for the penal system. 
To a large degree, the effectiveness of judicial intervention in the area 
of prison reform is circumscribed by the courts' inability to marshall 
financial commitments for that purpose. But the major difficulty con-
fronting the courts and those who envision social rehabilitation as a 
constitutional right lies in changing the public conceptualization of the 
penal system. The eighth amendment can only reflect the normative 
values of the American people. The future of the eighth amendment 
rests not so much with thoughtful jurists but rather with an informed 
and concerned public. 
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